Abstract

The United Nations (UN) was established as a multilateral platform with the goal of fostering international cooperation and maintaining peace across the globe. However, persistent inequalities and imbalances in power among member states often skew important decision-making processes and, consequently, create outcomes favouring more powerful nations. This article discusses the structural and systematic factors which contribute to these imbalances, focusing on the disproportionate influence that the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council hold. These power differences have detrimental effects on diplomatic problem solving, as underscored in various examples throughout the article. These differences have subsequently caused frustration and experiences of marginalisation from rapidly developing countries, whose political power is constantly expanding. Moreover, the P5 are reluctant to lose the strong influence they wield, leading to resistance to change. This raises questions surrounding potential reforms to the UNSC’s structure, aimed at creating greater balance and a more inclusive system to allow impartial diplomatic problem solving.

Introduction

The United Nations is an international organisation that was founded in 1945, following the end of World War II. It was established to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations, and promote social progress, better living standards, and human rights. A successor to the League of Nations which had attempted to fulfil similar goals but had ultimately failed to preserve peace, the United Nations’ charter was initially signed by 51 nations in 1945 (National Archives, 2022). With six main principal organs — the General Assembly (GA), the Security Council (SC), the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the UN Secretariat — the organisation maintains its commitment to maintaining global peace.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the premier body of the UN and is primarily responsible for maintaining this international peace and security (Chowdhury, 2024). However, the UNSC has been criticised for propagating inequality and power differences amongst countries over the years. The UNSC is composed of 15 members including five permanent members, known as the P5 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and 10 non-permanent members, who are elected for two-year terms. The P5 members hold significantly more power within the Council over non-permanent members due to their permanent status and the privilege of veto. The veto allows any of these five nations to block resolutions regardless of the level of international support the resolution has accumulated or the potential positive impact it represents. The P5’s ability to prevent the adoption of any resolution effectively means that it can easily alter the Council’s decisions. This hierarchy of power marginalises the influence of the non-permanent members resulting in the decision-making power of the UNSC being biased against countries not included in the P5 (Cajigal et al., 2023). The concentration of power within the P5 highlights significant inequality that calls into question the very stance of equality that the UN aims to promote (Winther, 2020).

As the dynamics of global power shift, newly emerging economies such as India, Brazil, and South Africa have been consistently advocating for permanent membership in the UNSC. This paper examines the power dynamics within the UN, the impact of these imbalances on diplomatic outcomes, the resistance to change from the P5, and current reform proposals. Through the exploration of these themes, this paper aims to discuss the challenges and possibilities involved in reforming the UNSC for better global governance.

Background

Central to the issue of inequality and one of the most significant critiques of the UNSC is its failure to adequately represent the Global South. The Global South is a term used to broadly describe the regions of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Oceania. Despite the growing geo-political and economic power of countries in these regions, they are largely excluded from the key decision-making processes of the UNSC. For example, countries such as India and Japan have consistently advocated for permanent membership in the UNSC, putting forth the argument that their inclusion would reflect the current global power dynamics more accurately. However, their efforts have been met with much resistance from the P5 and other member states (Patrick, 2023).

The exclusion of the Global South by permanent membership, and the lack of veto power for non-permanent members, corroborates a system where the interests of a few powerful countries are prioritised over those of the majority. This imbalance is particularly evident in the way the UNSC handles conflicts and crises in the Global South, where decision making is done without input from the countries of the Global South that are affected by the problem.

The power dynamics within the UNSC often lead to internal conflict. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine is one example of how the UNSC finds itself in stalemates and cannot aid effectively due to the conflicting interests of its permanent members. Russia has utilised its veto power to overrule any resolutions that condemn its actions or would work against its interests. This situation demonstrates how the UNSC’s structure can hinder its ability to function effectively as a joint body responsible for maintaining international peace and security. Instead of facilitating diplomacy and cooperation, the UNSC often acts as a stage for the P5 members to assert their influence, leading to a frozen situation preventing meaningful action.

The unequal power dynamics within the UNSC have led to widespread calls for reform. One of the most requested proposals is a call to expand the number of permanent and non-permanent members to include more countries, particularly from the Global South (United Nations, 2023). The G4 countries — Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil — have consistently voiced their opinions, advocating for permanent UNSC seats, reflecting their growing influence in the international economy. There have also been calls for the inclusion of African countries as permanent members to elevate their voices, as the African continent is subjected to most of the decisions of the UNSC without any input (Tasamba, 2023).

Another major proposal is to modify the veto power. Some have suggested restricting the use of the veto or allowing a supermajority of the Council to override a veto (Soltes, 2023). This would reduce the ability of the P5 to block resolutions while encouraging more cooperative decision making. However, such reforms face significant challenges as any changes to the UNSC’s structure require the approval of two-thirds of the UN General Assembly, as well as the agreement of all P5 members, who are unlikely to support reforms that may remove their veto power. Reforming the UNSC is a complex, long and gradual process, especially due to the major power difference.

Impact of Power Differences on Diplomatic Issues and Outcomes

The largest and most obvious power difference within the UNSC is veto power, which the permanent five (P5) members all hold, allowing them to block any proposed resolution, regardless of support from other members. This power has been used to varying degrees by the P5, with Russia (counting the years it had been the Soviet Union holding the seat) using it to block 155 resolutions, and the United States using it 90 times (Basarkar et al., 2024). The extensive use of this veto has created a power imbalance where any member of the P5 can hold greater influence over the UNSC, negating other, non-permanent, members’ influence over major decisions unless their interests are in line with P5 members. Subsequently, diplomatic outcomes usually favour the interests of P5 members over global or regional stability, diminishing multilateralism and potentially leading to prolonged crises that could be ended swiftly otherwise.

An example of this extensive use creating a negative influence can be seen in the last few times the United States vetoed resolutions on December 8th 2023 and February 2024, which called for a cease-fire in the war between Israel and Hamas (Al Jazeera, 2024). The United States has historically used its veto power to protect Israel from Security Council decisions, with approximately one-third of its negative votes since 1972 applied to resolutions critical of Israel (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). These resolutions that were vetoed often condemned Israeli settlement activities, military actions, or violation of international law, and called for protection of Palestinian rights.

While the US protects its ally Israel by doing this, it also simultaneously provides Israel with significant diplomatic leverage. Israel now understands that any resolution that may be seen as overly critical towards them or that demands great concession has a highly likely chance to be vetoed by the United States, reducing Israel’s incentive to take part in significant negotiations, inducing a stagnation in diplomacy and various peace talks, and prolonging its involved conflict further than it should go.

Veto usage also leads to an impact on the non-permanent members of the UNSC. In this specific context these members, especially ones more sympathetic to Palestine rather than Israel, have to deal with the difficulties of advancing resolutions that will lead to concrete actions. With the knowledge that the US will veto any resolution that is perceived as anti-Israel in any way, non-permanent members usually attempt to dilute their proposals to the point that they appear to be more symbolic, rather than substantive and having any great effect. The effectiveness of diplomatic efforts is reduced by this, further highlighting how the veto power blocks meaningful resolutions, perpetuating conflict and hindering international peace and security. This has led to numerous criticisms of veto usage, causing it to be seen as “undemocratic, irrational, and against the true spirit of the principle sovereign equality enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations” (Chowdhury, 2024).

Another example of P5 members using greater diplomatic leverage to dictate the terms of negotiations within the UNSC can be seen during the Syrian Civil War (2011–ongoing, ceasefire since 2020). During this war, P5 member Russia consistently used its veto power, blocking resolutions that were aimed at condemning the Syrian government or imposing sanctions upon it. In fact, Russia used its veto 17 times since 2011 to block the Council’s efforts to protect the Syrian people, in addition to the other numerous times it has used it, including to protect itself following its illegal invasion of Ukraine. Russia has therefore leveraged its veto power to allow it to protect its strategic ally, the Assad Regime in Syria. This has enabled Russia to keep its large influence over the outcome of the conflict in Syria and to assert its geopolitical interests in the Middle East. This clearly illustrates how power dynamics can shape diplomatic negotiations and outcomes within the UNSC, leading to outcomes that are favourable to those wielding veto powers and inaction in the face of significant global issues.

However, it is vital to note that there are ways in which countries in the UNSC can leverage the power difference other than using the veto, such as utilising the economic and military differences between the countries. Powerful countries, such as those in the P5, may use their large economic or military influence to win over the opinions of other UNSC members and to rally support from them, ensuring that the decisions of these countries align with their interests. Some scholars have even argued that the UNSC is a place where powerful states can work together to check other states’ military ambitions (Dayal & Dunton, 2023). This highlights the divide caused in the UNSC, further hindering the achievement of true, meaningful diplomacy.

The large power differences in the UN and their global effects have undoubtedly raised questions on whether true elitist multilateralism has been achieved in this modern age, with some opinions firm on the fact that it has lost all soul and objectivity. It can be argued from a similar perspective that there is no genuine engagement, no desire to mutually accommodate, and no willingness to rise above a narrow agenda triggered by self-interest (Chowdhury, 2024). These attitudes are in direct opposition to the interests of the UN and its goal of pursuing international diplomacy and peace, and introduce the argument for a feasible change of structure or reform of the UNSC to promote these original values.

Resistance to Change Including from Powerful Economies

The inequality in the United Nations Security Council primarily comes from the veto rights that the P5 members possess. This right has, at times, prevented the settlement of international issues. As a result of veto power between 1946 and 2004, a little over 200 resolutions were rejected (Wouters, Ruys, 2005). The five permanent members also have the right to prevent other states from gaining permanent membership in the UNSC, which has enabled the P5 members to actively prevent reforms to the UNSC, to keep their international power. Countries like South Africa, Brazil, India, and other emerging economies have faced difficulties in joining the five permanent members or finding ways to become more equal in the UNSC (Patrick, 2023).

The most prominent recent act of resistance in the UNSC was shown by the United States in 2024. The United States vetoed Palestine’s full membership in the UN (Nichols, 2024). This caused criticism towards the United States’ decision and is also an example of the way that the power which permanent members possess leaves other nations out from making their own decisions on the international scale. This is the abuse of power that the P5 countries might exercise, and the inability to change from old habits (including rivalries between states).

Permanent members often act like hegemons, trying to dominate the situation and prevent any opposition. Current difficulties in solving diplomatic issues have led to a potential undermining of the Security Council’s reputation. This shows that the establishment of permanent members was rather outdated, as they were established in 1945 and since that time new economies have emerged, including countries like India and Brazil. However, the P5 are extremely resistant to reform. In 2022, during a debate on Security Council Reform, the Russian Federation opposed curtailing the veto power, despite many representatives expressing the unfairness of the power exercised by the five permanent members (United Nations, 2022). However, in the past this resistance existed as well. The United States and the Russian Federation resisted the changes that were proposed in 1997, such as the aim of providing a more inclusive environment in the Security Council and the reconsideration of the veto power (Swart, 2015). The US was concerned that an expanded Council could dilute its influence, while Russia was wary of losing its status as the only Eastern European representative. The resistance from these P5 members effectively stalled the reform efforts, maintaining the existing structure and the unequal distribution of power within the Security Council. Due to this, the concept of Responsibility to Protect was adopted. This is a principle, also known as R2P, that “seeks to ensure that the international community never fails again to halt the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity” (Global Centre For The Responsibility to Protect, 2023). After the UN-authorised military intervention in Libya in 2011 under R2P, Russia and China became increasingly wary of how this doctrine was being applied. They believed the intervention, which led to the overthrow of the leader Muammar Gaddafi, exceeded its original mandate of protecting civilians and was used as a pretext for regime change. As a direct consequence, when a resolution was proposed in 2012 to impose sanctions on Libya and refer the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) due to the Libyan government’s brutal crackdown on protesters, Russia and China vetoed it (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). This action blocked international efforts to hold the Libyan government accountable and demonstrated how the P5 can use their veto power to resist changes in how international norms like R2P are enforced, thereby preserving their unequal influence over UN decisions. 

The resistance of P5 members to changes in the United Nations Security Council reflects their desire to maintain the power and influence they have held since the Council’s creation in 1945. Their use of veto power, particularly in cases like the Syrian conflict, highlights how they can block international efforts that do not align with their national interests. This resistance not only perpetuates inequality within the UN but also undermines the organisation’s ability to address global crises effectively. As the world has evolved, with new emerging powers like India and Brazil, the outdated structure of the Security Council has increasingly come under scrutiny. However, without the willingness of the P5 to embrace reform, the Council’s legitimacy and ability to promote international peace may continue to be questioned.

Current Reform Proposals

Much of the United Nations’ reform policy seeks to emulate the success of 1965, in which the Security Council was expanded from eleven to 15 members and designated ten seats assigned to geographic regions. This success has generated further discussion of whether the UN should be reformed structurally or simply expanded (Afoaku & Ukaga, 2001). This has become increasingly relevant given the shortcomings of the “Responsibility to Protect” programme which was endorsed by the General Assembly in 2005. It sought to ensure global security and uphold human rights if governments failed to protect their populations (House of Commons Library, 2008). As a result of the endorsement, regional organisations including the African Union, European Union, and the Organization of American States launched their regional initiatives, which were met with very mixed results. The R2P was born in the aftermath of the Kosovo war and the Rwandan genocide; as the UNSC failed to pass any meaningful action, the international community looked for an alternative solution, but this solution ultimately fell short due to nations lacking both funding and clear rubrics on when to intervene (Paterson & Virk, 2013). Consequently, it became apparent that delegating responsibility for conflict resolution to regional powers was not sustainable or efficient, and the UNSC would have to serve the role of a global, well-funded, peacekeeping power. Even though representatives support the creation of a rapid reaction force for UN peacekeeping, and others support integration with regional organisations such as the African Union, it is clear that short-term regional security policies will be unable to solve greater issues – rather, UNSC reform is needed (Lyon et al., 2020). The exclusive and significant resources and legitimacy of the UNSC enable it to create a long-term and equal resolution of conflicts globally.

There exist two main schools of thought regarding potential methods of reform: one of structural changes and the other of working reform (Winther, 2020). Generally, proponents of structural reform want the charter of the UN to be altered in order to improve the structure and membership of the Council and the veto right. Opposingly, those suggesting working reforms do not require an alteration of the charter and prefer informal agreements between countries on how diplomacy should operate. Even before the 1965 reform, there existed discontent at the existence of the exclusive veto, which has continued to be a pressing issue for both structural and working reformists (de Hevesy, 1957). Additionally, there existed a push for an enlargement of the UNSC to improve representation and equity (Armstrong, 1961).

Proponents of structural reform argue that the framework is outdated, as the five veto members were chosen over 75 years ago, and membership now requires change to reflect contemporary geopolitical realities. Some reformists propose that there should be more members in order to reflect the current global spread of power, in which the Global South is becoming increasingly relevant. An example of this is Langmore and Thakur (2016) who argue that there should be 18 members of the Council and that members should remain on the Council for an extra year. Others propose a split between permanent and non-permanent members, but generally, most structural reformists support an expansion of the membership. However, critically, many exclude the mention of veto reforms from their proposals. If the UNSC were expanded there would inevitably be a significant question of whether veto rights should be expanded or removed altogether. On this point, working reformists claim they have a solution for the issue: increasing transparency and equality between members. Many working reformists believe that a realistic point of view needs to be taken and accept that it is unlikely that such sweeping reforms can be feasibly carried out. Instead, they argue that the process of how the UNSC operates needs to change, in order to break the veto-induced deadlock that has existed for decades. Proponents, such as Fassbender, state that it is futile to reform the charter and that there should be no new permanent members with veto rights (Fassbender, 1998, p. 364). For some the solution to the issue of vetos is an informal agreement system, in which the usage of vetos becomes reduced in the name of greater collaboration (Nadin, 2016). Another issue with structural reform they point out is that it is inevitable that the geopolitical power balance of the world will shift every few decades; therefore, the UNSC would have to be constantly reformed structurally, which would be a formidable task to carry out. Instead, they argue for improvement to the ways in which the UNSC operates, which appears to be more feasible (Hassler, 2012). Generally, the structural reformists value the principles of democracy and equality as the most critical factors in diplomacy, whereas the working reformists advocate for pragmatism.

As a whole, the two sides of the argument are not mutually exclusive, and a likely solution would require moderates on both sides to collaborate. Nonetheless, it seems that working reform would be much easier to achieve than structural reform and would face less resistance from P5 members, although its impacts would certainly be much more limited than structural reform. Critically, the demand for structural reform has been growing, due to global geopolitical realignment, which does not appear to be slowing down. Nevertheless, if either side were successful it would do much to improve the efficiency of the UNSC, which, in turn, would improve legitimacy, and vice-versa.

Another critical element of the debate is the divide between the Global South and North. The South generally advocates for structural reforms, in order to elevate their power in global politics and help fuel their growth. In contrast, the North supports working solutions, in order to maintain stability and their current advantage in the international community. However, what is clear is that global opinions greatly vary between nations and that different countries seek specific reforms (Patrick et al., 2023). Advocacy groups also play a significant role in sponsoring reform proposals, with the G4 and the African Union being the largest players. Each group possesses significant power, due to their individual global hard power, but also because of their votes within the General Assembly, which requires a two-thirds majority for a charter change; the African Union, which has 45 members, consequently holds a large amount of power. As a result of this, it has held a strong position (Mbara et al., 2021). The African Union seeks veto rights for all UNSC members and an expansion to 26 members, of whom seven should be African nations. On the other hand, the G4 is advocating for a permanent seat for each of its members and another four for African nations. Therefore, it is obvious that the two groups disagree on membership; however, the G4’s position on veto rights remains flexible.

Possible Changes to the Structure of the UN in the Future

​​The question of UN reform is a near-impossible one to resolve. While most UN members agree that reform is necessary, disagreements exist over whether the focus of this reform should be to capitalise on the capabilities of major powers or to ensure that members are more equally represented (Patrick, 2023). Furthermore, the P5’s resistance to reform, discussed above, is a major obstacle to being able to reform the body effectively.

The organ which needs the most reform is the UNSC, as it currently does not reflect the diversity of the current geo-political landscape (Bordachev, 2023). By making the Council more representative, its authority, legitimacy, and effectiveness would arguably all be strengthened. The most obvious reform would be the expansion of the Council. Almost 80 years after the UN was created, the P5 remains the same, even despite the emergence of new key players in global politics such as India, Brazil, Japan, and Germany, all of whom are often suggested as strong candidates for permanent membership (Patrick, 2023). An expanded Council could include permanent members without veto power – which could be a way of appeasing the current P5 and persuading them to agree with the proposals – or the veto power could be shared among more states, thus diluting the current P5’s dominance. However, this latter proposal would likely be met with a lot of resistance from the P5, whereas the former could be a viable change. In September 2022, President Biden said before the UN General Assembly that the US is now in support of not only “permanent seats for those nations we’ve long supported” (that is, Japan, Germany, and India) but also “permanent seats for countries in Africa [and] Latin America and the Caribbean” (The White House, 2022). However, Russia and China both oppose the introduction of new permanent members.

Although the expansion of the Council is a possibility, none of the P5 support reform to the veto, which in itself is yet another frustrating aspect of the UNSC’s structure for many member states. Reform to the veto power will be a key part of any reform made to the UNSC. On many occasions, the ability of just one country to unilaterally block UNSC resolutions in order to further their national interest has led to Council paralysis, which prevents the UN from being able to take effective action in crises such as the ongoing Isareli-Palestinian conflict. This has been exacerbated in recent years by the deepening geo-political rivalry between Western democracies and China and Russia. An increasing number of member states and experts in the field view the Council as an organ dominated by powers only motivated by their self-interest and who are inclined to abuse their positions of power (Patrick, 2023). Some have proposed entirely eliminating the veto. Volodymyr Zelensky, for example, at a UNSC meeting in 2022 proposed convening a global conference to negotiate UN reform in response to Russia’s unilateral obstruction of UN action against Russia in the wake of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. However, the prospect of elimination of the veto is extremely unrealistic as the US and China are vehemently against it (Winther, 2022). A more realistic proposal has come from France, which, alongside 103 other member states, is in favour of limiting the use of the veto in cases involving mass atrocities like genocide or war crimes (Emch, 2015), while another proposal that may be more popular would involve requiring at least two or three permanent members to agree for a veto to be effective, thus reducing unilateral obstruction and working towards a more inclusive platform for global governance.

Although these reforms would not necessarily make the Security Council more effective in and of themselves, they would make it a more legitimate body, thus enhancing its effectiveness because of the increase in support that would ensue from the rest of the UN member states (Winther, 2020). This may be particularly noticeable in Africa’s case, as having more African permanent members would improve the UN’s approach to peace missions on the continent (García Iommi, 2019).

Conclusion

The UN’s structure has both reinforced and caused further inequality between its member states. Specifically, the UNSC’s inadequate structure has persisted in hampering international diplomacy and conflict resolution, which has in turn prevented diplomatic compromises from occurring. The extreme concentration of the UNSC’s power in the P5 has created a structural bias in favour of the P5’s national interests, which are often not aligned with global stability. This has been both reflected by frequent veto usage and by the increasing marginalisation of the non-permanent members, which works to further historic inequalities. Therefore, the UNSC, and to some extent the UN, has undergone a process of delegitimisation and increasing dysfunction. Yet, the P5 have remained resistant to reform, driven by their reluctance to relinquish their privileges.

However, recently there has been growing pressure to address the UN’s failures in adapting to a rapidly evolving geo-political landscape, in which emerging economies and regional powers are increasingly gaining prominence. Proposals to increase the Council’s permanent and non-permanent membership, and alter the strength of the veto, reflect a growing consensus that a more representative and balanced UNSC is needed. Despite numerous obstacles, reform remains essential to restoring the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UNSC. Representation could be gained by expanding the Council, revising permanent members, or modifying veto rights, which could help to remedy some of the inherent problems with the current UNSC. Additionally, working reforms can help to improve the inner workings of the Council to foster greater collaboration. However, for change to occur there must be a willingness between countries and advocacy groups to support this change in order to improve the fairness of the UNSC and its decision outcomes. An expanded and fairer Council with broader representation would improve the global community’s ability to respond to global challenges more equitably and effectively, thereby reinforcing the core goals that underpinned the founding of the UN: maintaining international peace and security.

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